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11 The beneﬁts of accreditation clubs
for fundraising nonproﬁts
René Bekkers
How can fundraising organizations signal trustworthiness to prospective
donors? One way to do this is by conforming to standards of excellence
and allowing a trusted, independent agency to monitor the organization
with regard to these standards. The Central Bureau of Fundraising (CBF)
in the Netherlands is an example of a club running such an accountability
program. This chapter empirically investigates whether (1) awareness of
the accountability program among donors increases donations by house-
holds; and (2) fundraising organizations that participate in the account-
ability program attract more donations than organizations that do not. To
help understand the context in which the program operates, I will ﬁrst
brieﬂy describe the regulation of fundraising in the Netherlands.
In contrast to the US context of many of the chapters in this volume, in
the Netherlands the regulation of nonproﬁts can be described as a combi-
nation of few legal requirements, little government involvement, some
self-regulation, and independentmonitoring by a third party. The focus of
the regulation that does exist is on fundraising practices. Nonproﬁt organ-
izations that want to claim tax-exemption status have to register with the
tax authorities, but are not required to submit audited ﬁnancial state-
ments or elaborate reports to obtain the status. To raise money in a door-
to-door collection or in town, a permit from the municipality in which the
collection is planned is required. Door-to-door collection is still a very
common method of raising funds in the Netherlands. Such fundraising is
done by unpaid volunteers for large, national fundraising organizations.
Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the 6th Workshop on the Challenges of
Managing the Third Sector, March 12–13, 2007, in Venice; at the 35th Annual Conference
of the Association for Research onNonproﬁt and Voluntary Action,November 16–18, 2006,
in Chicago; and at theWorkshop onCertiﬁcation Systems for Nonproﬁt Organizations,May
23–24, 2005, in Prague. I thank the Central Bureau of Fundraising for making available the
data on income and expenses of fundraising organizations, and I thank Ad Graaman in
particular for clariﬁcations and additions to the database. I am also indebted to the editors,
Richard Steinberg, Andreas Ortmann, Katarína Svítková, Dennis Young, Woods Bowman,
Eddy Bekkers, Adri Kemps, and Ad Graaman who provided helpful comments on previous
versions of this chapter. I thank Merel Ooms for research assistance.
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About one in ﬁve volunteers in the Netherlands is active in raising funds
(Bekkers, 2005). However, for national fundraising campaigns conducted
via ordinary direct mail, email, or telephone no such requirements exist.
National law prohibits selling or sharing of nonopt-in address lists
between and/or among fundraising organizations andmarketing agencies.
Marketing agencies that are members of the Dutch Direct Marketing
Association generally conform to the rule that they will not approach
persons who have registered with Infoﬁlter, a national database of
“Don’t call/mail me” addresses. Membership of the DDMA, however,
is voluntary. Nonmembers do not have to conform to the “Don’t call me”
rule. Despite this liberal treatment of fundraising by nonproﬁt organiza-
tions, very few cases of fraud, abuse of funds, and other irregularities have
been documented in the past decades. Such cases have involved only
relatively small organizations.1
The relative absence of irregularities may be due to some extent to the
accountability program run by the CBF. I brieﬂy describe the program
here. More details on the program are given in a previous study (Bekkers,
2003) and on the organization’s website.2 The CBF is an independent
nongovernmental organization.3 TheCBF has nomembers and likemany
European accreditation programs, it receives a substantial public subsidy
and relies on this income as well as income from fees for its revenue base
(Wilke, 2003). The CBF develops standards for excellence, evaluates
nonproﬁts on the basis of those standards, and issues a “seal of approval”
to national fundraising organizations that have existed for at least three
years and that meet the standards.4 The standards include rules on board
structure, the provision of ﬁnancial statements issued by an external
accountant, transparency to donors, complaint procedures, and a ceiling
1 One of the few exceptions is the October 2007 case in which a volunteer for KWF
Kankerbestrijding – a health charity ﬁghting cancer and the largest fundraising nonproﬁt
organization in the country – stole €15,000 from the door-to-door collection funds she
helped to raise.
2 See www.cbf.nl/Home/uk.php for more information.
3 This has not always been the case. The CBF was established in 1925 as an ofﬁce coordi-
nating local fundraising activities of national fundraising organizations. The ﬁfty-two
weeks of the year were assigned to the major fundraising organizations such that citizens
were not facing two collections for different organizations in the same week. The system
still exists, but is managed by a different organization. It should also be noted that two
members of the board represent the branch organization of fundraising organizations
(VFI). One member represents the government (Department of Justice), three members
represent the municipalities, and three members are not representing any institution or
organization.
4 Since its introduction in 1997, the CBF seal has been issued to 271 fundraising organ-
izations. An additional 59 organizations have a “verklaring van geen bezwaar,” which is
issued to smaller fundraising organizations that are on their way to meet the same stand-
ards. These organizations are not considered as accredited fundraising organizations.
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for fundraising costs (25 percent of fundraising income), among other
things.5 Recently, additional standards have been formulated as part of
the evaluation procedure. These club standards go far beyond the legal
requirements for fundraising organizations sketched above. The club
standards are also much more stringent than those adopted by the
national and state nonproﬁt associations (respectively) discussed in chap-
ters 4 and 5 by Tschirhart and Young elsewhere in this volume.
Meeting the CBF club standards involves nontrivial costs.6 The eval-
uation procedure requires a substantial time investment of the CEO and
ﬁnancial director to answer questions about the organization’s activities,
management, and expenses. In addition to the labor costs required to
complete the procedure, nonproﬁt organizations pay fees. There is a ﬁxed
fee for the ﬁrst evaluation procedure (€4,360) as well as a variable annual
fee for the right to bear the seal, depending on fundraising income
(ranging from €3,000 to €7,000). The accreditation is valid for ﬁve
years. After this period, the organization has to complete the procedure
again in order to retain the accreditation. The reevaluation procedure
costs €2,195. The CBF evaluates the information provided and decides
about accreditation.
The club has two main swords against failure to conform to the stand-
ards: press releases and, ultimately, withholding the seal. In the period
1994–2004, none of the accredited organizations was evicted or left the
program voluntarily. In recent years, however, one international develop-
ment organization with a religious background has left the program vol-
untarily, and three organizations were withheld the seal owing to
irregularities and/or incapacity to produce the required information.
Because the procedure is costly and intensive, it is unlikely that organ-
izations that have something to hide will enter and successfully complete
the evaluation procedure. Though it is impossible to check, it is likely that
the costs associated with accreditation limit entry of “bad apples” to the
Dutch fundraising market. For these reasons, consumers can be expected
5 The accreditation seal is not a trademark, nor is it strongly protected by law. Although the
law does not prohibit fundraising organizations that do not abide by the standards of the
CBF from bearing the seal, this has not occurred in practice. It is also very unlikely to
happen because such organizations would be easily detected by the media, the Dutch
donor association, the consumer association, and/or theCBF itself. The only legal arrange-
ment concerning the seal is that the major national charitable lotteries cannot beneﬁt
organizations that are not accredited.
6 As a purely anecdotal note: when I presented a previous version of this chapter in 2006 to
an audience of fundraising directors, the representative of Greenpeace questioned the net
beneﬁt of the seal because of the “enormous amount of effort” required to complete the
evaluation procedure. Several representatives of smaller organizations identiﬁed the effort
required as a reason not to apply, despite the expected increase in fundraising income.
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to be fairly conﬁdent that accredited organizations do not violate the
standards set by the system.7
Another strength of the system is that the CBF is an independent
nonproﬁt organization. Thus, donors are less likely to doubt the accred-
itation seal than information provided solely by fundraising organiza-
tions.8 Results from a poll survey held in November 2005 among Dutch
consumers revealed that 78 percent had “sufﬁcient” or more conﬁdence
in the CBF, while 71 percent reported such conﬁdence in national fund-
raising nonproﬁt organizations and only 49 percent said they had at least
sufﬁcient conﬁdence in government (Zalpha van Berkel and WWAV,
2005). In September 2008, these ﬁgures were 77 percent, 68 percent,
and 50 percent, respectively (WWAV, 2008).
Because the club standards are rather stringent, the signal that the
accreditation seal sends out is credible. The purpose of the system accord-
ing to the CBF is to enable donors to make more informed decisions. In
other words, the accountability program reduces the asymmetry of infor-
mation that donors face in their decisionmaking on charitable giving,
viewing donors as the key principals the club is designed to serve. In
terms of the club perspective, the CBF is a strong club. Club membership
gives members a branding beneﬁt – the right to use the seal in fundraising
campaigns. The seal is a club good: it is a nonrival beneﬁt for members,
excludable for nonmembers. This does not imply that the beneﬁts of
accreditation accrue only to those who decide to join the program.
Organizations that free-ride may beneﬁt as well.
The trust problem in philanthropy
The effectiveness and efﬁciency of the services provided by nonproﬁt
organizations are important factors in the eyes of donors when thinking
about donations (Arumi et al., 2005). However, donors face a high level of
uncertainty about whether a nonproﬁt organization is effective and efﬁcient
7 This is not to say that accredited organizations make no mistakes, or work 100 percent
effectively. Accreditation also does not guarantee that the organization abides by desirable
standards that are not part of the accountability program. For instance, the public desires
that fundraising managers and CEOs earn lower salaries than persons in comparable for-
proﬁt ﬁrms. However, there are no limits on salaries in the CBF standards.
8 Ultimately, the CBF relies on reports provided by fundraising organizations themselves
because the ﬁnancial statements approved by external accountants are produced by
accountants who are working for these organizations. Accountants would endanger their
own reputation by approving ﬁnancial statements that are grossly incorrect. However, as
the Enron case shows, this is not a 100 percent guarantee against misrepresentations or
fraud. Accountants may bend the rules for accounting in cooperation with the fundraising
organizations that they work for (Wing and Hager, 2004).
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because nonproﬁt organizations often provide services of which the quality
is difﬁcult to observe and evaluate. The introductory chapter of this volume
outlines this problem of asymmetry of information. In the absence of
accurate information about an organization’s output, donors have to rely
on their personal impressions of the trustworthiness of fundraising organ-
izations. In many cases, donors are not recipients of services provided by
nonproﬁt organizations, and donors and recipients of nonproﬁt organiza-
tions do not know each other personally. International development organ-
izations or environmental and wildlife organizations are good examples of
nonproﬁt organizations that provide services primarily to nondonors. In
addition, they also work in distant areas. For decisions about donations to
such organizations, the problem of uncertainty is most pressing. How can
donors decidewhether their contributionmakes a difference?How can they
know where their contribution is used most effectively? Donors want
information about the nonproﬁt’s mission, activities, overhead, and fund-
raising costs, and form an impression of an organization’s efﬁciency using
this information (Parsons, 2003), even though ﬁnancial information is not
necessarily indicative of quality (Steinberg, 1986).
Two problems with information about fundraising organizations
reduce the likelihood that donors will put their charitable impulse into
action: costs and credibility. The ﬁrst problem is that formany donors, the
search costs involved in the acquisition of such information are too high.
Even in the USA, where information about fundraising organizations is
publicly available through the internet (at www.guidestar.org) only a
fraction of donors actively search for this information and use it (Arumi
et al., 2005). Guidestar is not used by the majority of donors because
gathering and interpreting the information is costly. Donors have to spend
time on the internet obtaining the data, and they have to interpret and
evaluate the data. This task is a difﬁcult one that requires cognitive
resources and time. Donors have to incur costs to “give wisely.” Most
donors are not prepared to incur these costs.
The second problem is that of credibility. How can donors be sure that
the information they receive from fundraising organizations is accurate?
The problem of credibility is a second reason why Guidestar is not often
used. Guidestar is based on data provided by the nonproﬁt organizations
themselves through the Form 990 that 501(c) organizations provide to the
IRS in order to obtain tax-exempt status. Because the IRS has very few
personnel to check the information provided, donors must rely on their
personal impression about the organization. They cannot be sure that the
data are accurate (Bowman and Bies, 2005). In contrast, donors in the
Netherlands can be fairly conﬁdent that the data provided by fundraising
organizations to the CBF are accurate.
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The fundraising problem
From the perspective of nonproﬁt organizations that are trying to raise
funds, the credibility problem emerges in a different light. For individual
nonproﬁt organizations, the problem is how they can persuade donors of
their trustworthiness. From the agency perspective, nonproﬁts must
persuade donors that they are “accountable,” meaning that they will
do their best to fulﬁll donor wishes. Svítková and Ortmann (2006) call
this the “fundraising problem.” If fundraising organizations can show
donors that they provide services of higher quality and that they are a
more efﬁcient organization, they will gain a competitive advantage in the
market.
Donors may doubt the accuracy of information provided by nonproﬁt
organizations themselves. The fundraising problem for fundraising
organizations and the trust problem for donors can be solved if trust-
worthy information about fundraising organizations is available at no cost
to donors. This is exactly what the program does. Generally speaking,
seals of approval reduce search costs for consumers (Bennett and
McCrohan, 1993). This also holds for decisions about donations to fund-
raising organizations. Fundraising organizations use the accreditation seal
as a signal to donors that their organization is trustworthy, in the same way
that for-proﬁt ﬁrms use certiﬁcation standards (e.g., ISO 9000; Terlaak
and King, 2006).
The Dutch accountability club works as a reputation signaling system.
When donors receive a fundraising appeal from a nonproﬁt organization,
they can evaluate the trustworthiness of the organization by looking for the
seal. If donors actually rely on the seal in their decisions on charitable
contributions, it should give fundraising organizations that use the seal a
competitive advantage over nonproﬁt organizations that do not use the
seal: accredited organizations stand out as more trustworthy. The ﬁrst
hypothesis tested below is therefore:
H1 Nonproﬁt organizations that participate in the accountability club
increase fundraising income more strongly than nonproﬁt organizations
that do not participate.
The effect on donors is that the seal legitimates conﬁdence in fund-
raising organizations among donors, and hence promotes giving. In the
absence of an accountability program, donors have to rely on their casual
impressions of the trustworthiness of nonproﬁt organizations, and they
will worry about whether their conﬁdence is justiﬁed. The public holds
overly negative views on the fundraising costs of nonproﬁt organizations
(Sargeant and Kähler, 1999; Bekkers, 2003). Such views are associated
with (but do not necessarily cause) reduced donations (Bekkers, 2003).
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When fundraising organizations are monitored by an independent
agency, however, donors may correct their views. Independent monitor-
ing provides an external piece of information that legitimates their con-
ﬁdence. A well-designed accountability program should therefore
increase the level of charitable conﬁdence among donors when they
learn about the system. Such a system would be an alternative to joining
an organization in order to obtain information about its trustworthiness
(Bowman, 2004). The hypotheses tested below are:
H2 Individuals who learn about the accountability club increase donations
more strongly than individuals who do not learn about the program.
H3 Individuals who learn about the accountability club gain conﬁdence in
fundraising organizations more strongly than individuals who do not learn
about the club.
H4 Individuals who learn about the accountability club increase donations
more strongly than individuals who do not learn about the club because of
enhanced conﬁdence.
Who responds to the accountability club?
There are good reasons to believe that accountability clubs are not
equally important to all types of donors. One would expect that large
donors would have stronger vested interests in accountability clubs.
Generally speaking, people search for more information in decisionmak-
ing about issues that are more important to them (Lanzetta and Driscoll,
1968). Those who give more to nonproﬁt organizations will ﬁnd the
trustworthiness of a fundraising organization soliciting contributions
more important because they have a larger amount of money at stake.
While Tinkelman (1998) found support for the hypothesis that large
donors are more responsive to ﬁnancial information from fundraising
organizations in a study of corporate giving, Bowman (2006) did not
ﬁnd support for the hypothesis in a study of households. However,
Bowman argues that his ﬁnding may have been the result of a low sample
size. Donors who give large amounts to fundraising organizations will
care more about the effectiveness of their contribution than donors who
give small amounts. A large donation to an ineffective organization is a
larger waste of money than a small donation. The hypothesis tested
below is:
H5 The higher the amount donated in previous years, the stronger the increase
in donations upon learning about the accountability program.
Who beneﬁts from participation?
There are good reasons to believe that accreditation is not equally bene-
ﬁcial to all types of fundraising nonproﬁt organizations. One would expect
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that accreditation is most beneﬁcial for organizations working beyond the
donor’s horizon, because they face a stronger asymmetry of information
problem. The less visible the qualities of an organization’s output are for
consumers, the higher the potential beneﬁts of external evaluations
(Terlaak and King, 2006). Donors will have more difﬁculty judging the
effectiveness and trustworthiness of fundraising organizations that oper-
ate in distant countries, or work for abstract causes like the environment
and human rights. Progress in poverty relief and human rights protection
is more difﬁcult to see than progress in provision of welfare or arts and
culture at the local level. In addition, poverty, ozone layer depletion, and
human rights violations are likely to continue in spite of the efforts of
nonproﬁt organizations. In such circumstances, donors may feel their
support is legitimate when they know the organization is accredited.
Local organizations, on the other hand, may not need accreditation
because donors are able to gain an idea of the effectiveness of the organ-
ization themselves by paying a visit to the organization or through infor-
mation from others who have contacts with the organization. Viewed from
the perspective of the fundraising organization one arrives at the same
hypothesis. Organizations that operate on a local level are more strongly
visible to donors, and subject to control. Local organizations cannot
afford mistakes because they would be noticed more easily. Thus:
H6 International development organizations beneﬁt more strongly from par-
ticipation in the accountability program than do other organizations.
The effect of accreditation on giving by households
In order to test the hypotheses on changes in donations among house-
holds, I use data from the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study
(GINPS), a longitudinal panel study of giving and volunteering behavior
among households. The GINPS has been conducted in May biannually
since 2002. Data are gathered in a computer-assisted self-interview
(CASI). Thus far, three waves have been completed. In wave 1, 1,964
respondents completed the survey; 1,246 of the wave 1 respondents also
completed wave 2, and 703 also completed wave 3. Total n in wave 2 was
1,316; n=1,474 in wave 3. I restrict the analyses to respondents who
participated in at least two waves of the survey.9
9 An important concern for the analyses is whether the group of respondents who partici-
pated in the second wave is representative of those who participated in the ﬁrst wave.
Selective panel attrition may endanger the validity of conclusions on the effects of learning
about accreditation. A logistic regression analysis of panel attrition on the predictors of
giving in 2004 used in the analyses showed only one signiﬁcant effect: a negative effect of
the level of education, indicating that university graduates were more likely to leave the
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First I estimate the inﬂuence of learning about the accountability
clubs on charitable giving in 2003. I do so by comparing donations in
2003 and 2005 among those who had learned about CBF and those
who had not, excluding those who already knew about the accreditation
seal in 2002 because they cannot have learned about the system (see
Figure 11.1).
Those who remained unaware of the system (n=621) gave €169 on
average in 2003, which is about the same as two years earlier (€163).
Those who learned about the system (n=183) gave €260 on average in
2003, which is substantially more than two years earlier (€209). Those
who knew about the accountability program already gave on average €417
in 2003, a slight increase since 2001 (€394).10 This pattern of results
suggests that those who became aware of the CBF increased their giving,
while those who remained unaware hardly did so. Looking at the subset of
respondents who participated in all three waves of the survey (n=703), I
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Figure 11.1 Mean amount donated in 2001, 2003 and 2005 by
awareness of accreditation
panel than those with lower levels of education. This is unfortunate because university
graduates give more. The selectivity of panel attrition with regard to education will lead to
an underestimation of the effect of education on giving in 2004.
10 Logistic regression analyses were conducted to explore other differences between those
who remained unaware of the system and those who were aware of it already in 2002 and
became aware in 2004, respectively. Those who became aware of the system were
younger, more highly educated, somewhat more likely to be members of an orthodox
Protestant or other religious group, and signiﬁcantly more trusting of others. Those who
were aware of the system already in 2002 were more likely to be married, members of a
small religious group, less likely to have children, more highly educated, more trusting of
others, and more likely to attend church often. They also received more solicitations for
charitable contributions.
The beneﬁts of accreditation clubs in the Netherlands 261
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/1499314/WORKINGFOLDER/GGT/9780521763141C11.3D 262 [253–280] 13.5.2010 9:10PM
ﬁnd that those who remained unaware of the system from 2002 to 2006
(n=330) gave €136 in 2005, a slight decrease since 2003. Those who had
learned about the system (n=114) gave €293 in 2005, substantially more
than in 2003. Those who knew about the accountability program already
gave on average €432, another increase.
Summing up: from 2001 to 2005, giving increased among the respond-
ents who were already aware of the CBF system in 2002. But giving
increased more strongly among respondents who became aware of the
system. Giving slightly decreased among those who remained unaware.
A tobit regression analysis of the amount donated in 2005 on learning
about the system (not shown in Table 11.1) shows that the gross effect of
learning about the accountability program is €217.11 When control vari-
ables are included, this difference is reduced to a still signiﬁcant €134 (see
Table 11.1, model 1). This result supports hypothesis 3. Themajor part of
the relationship of learning about accreditation with the amount donated
Table 11.1 Tobit regression of amount donated in 2005 (n=692; 586
uncensored, 106 censored)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Knew CBF already 218.3 *** 116.5 *** 128.9 *** 129.9 ***
Learned about CBF 133.9 * 114.7 ** 121.3 ** 121.9 **
Education 34.6 ** 7.7 1.5 1.5
Income (×10k) 20.1 ** 12.0 * 12.2 * 12.2 *
Church attendance 7.1 *** 3.2 *** 3.2 *** 3.2 ***
Personal solicitations 1.3 −10.5 −8.2 −8.0
Impersonal solicitations 45.1 * 22.9 25.6 25.5
High trust 112.9 *** 49.9 52.0 (*) 51.9 (*)
Amount 2001 .868 *** .785 *** .781 ***
Conﬁdence 37.8 (*) 29.3 (*)
Irritation 18.4 18.2
Program spending 1.4 (*) 1.4 (*)
CBF* amount 2001 11.8
Pseudo R square .0309 .0680 .0712 .0712
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Included in all regression models are
controls for age, gender, marital status, working status, home ownership, town size, and
religious afﬁliation.
11 This relationship is signiﬁcant, p<.000. The tobit model is used to take censoring of
donations into account. The effect of learning about accreditation in the OLS model
(€157) is somewhat smaller, but still signiﬁcant (p<.006).
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remains when the amount donated in 2001 is included in model 2. By
including this variable the effects of the other variables can be interpreted
as the effects on changes in giving. Thus, learning about the accountability
program is associated with an increase in the amount donated of €115 in
the period 2002–2006.12
When charitable conﬁdence, irritation, and beliefs about program
spending are included in model 3 the effect of learning about the
accountability program remains about the same (€121). Thus, conﬁ-
dence hardly mediates the effect of learning about accreditation, despite
the fact that it has a strong relationship with the amount donated. This
result stands in contrast to hypothesis 4. The anomaly will be discussed
below.
The results in model 4 do not support hypothesis 5, that learning about
accreditation increases giving more strongly among those who gave larger
amounts in the past. The interaction between learning about accreditation
and the amount donated in 2001 is positive, but not signiﬁcant. However,
in an analysis of the amount donated in 2003 the interaction between
learning about the system and the amount donated in 2001 is strongly
signiﬁcant (results available upon request). This result does support the
hypothesis. Together, the results imply that there may be an additional
effect of learning about accreditation among those who gave higher
amounts in the past, but that it is short lived.
Differential effects on giving to religion
and other causes
Table 11.2 shows the results of similar analyses separately for donations to
religion and other causes. The analyses show that learning about the CBF
accountability program affects donations to religion as well as causes other
12 Because amounts donated are highly skewed I also ran analyses of the natural log of the
amount donated. Results of these models show an effect of learning about the system of
75.2 percent, 64.0 percent, 60.8 percent, and 59.3 percent, in models 1–4, respectively. It
may be argued that learning about the accreditation system is endogenous and that
including the lagged amount donated and control variables still leaves room for unob-
served heterogeneity to bias the estimates. Indeed a Hausman test for a regression of the
amount donated on awareness of the accreditation system is highly signiﬁcant, χ2=100.05
(df=1), p<.000. I conducted a ﬁxed effects regression of the logged amount donated to
assess this criticism and found that learning about accreditation increases giving by 15.3
percent (p<.081). This estimate is considerably smaller than the effect of learning about
accreditation reported in model 2 of Table 11.1, which is about 70.6 percent (the €115
from model 2 in Table 11.1 divided by €163, the mean amount donated by households
who were unaware of the system in 2002). The difference implies that to some extent
unobserved heterogeneity is driving the results reported in Table 11.1, but not
completely.
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than religion; the former relationship appears to be somewhat stronger
than the latter.
The results in the ﬁrst column of Table 11.2 show that learning about
CBF increased giving to religion in 2003 by about €120 when sociodemo-
graphic characteristics and donations in 2001 are taken into account. This
ﬁnding is somewhat surprising. Despite the fact that none of the major
churches in the Netherlands has the right to bear the accreditation seal,
the churches did receive higher amounts from those who learned about
the program. This ﬁnding suggests that there is an unintended positive
externality generated by club participation. The purpose of the system is
to enable donors to discriminate between organizations that are subject to
monitoring and those that are not. Now it turns out that nonaccredited
organizations also beneﬁt from the system. Donors may have the appa-
rently rather vague impression that fundraising organizations are subject
to some form of monitoring, but may not know exactly which organiza-
tions are accredited.
The strongly positive effect of religious donations in 2001 indicates that
religious giving is habit-like behavior: an additional €100 in 2001 is
Table 11.2 Tobit regression of amount donated to religion
and causes other than religion in 2005
Religion Other
Coeff. p Coeff. p
Knew CBF already 73.2 (*) 91.7 ***
Learned about CBF 119.7 ** 53.1 *
Education 2.2 4.5
Income (×10k) 16.7 ** 4.1
Attendance 2.4 *** −0.3
Personal solicitations −1.0 −6.4
Impersonal solicitations 26.1 40.5 **
High trust 26.9 37.7 *
Amount religion 2001 .862 *** .421 ***
Amount other 2001 .050 .373 ***
Conﬁdence −10.2 26.6 (*)
Irritation −2.0 9.4
Program spending 1.4 0.9 (*)
n (censored) 692 (432) 692 (115)
Pseudo R square .1197 .0490
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; (*) p<.10. Included in all regression models
are controls for age, gender, marital status, working status, home ownership,
town size, and religious afﬁliation.
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associated with an additional €86 four years later. Conﬁdence, irritation,
and perceptions of program spending are not related to religious
donations.
The results in the second column reveal that learning about the
accountability program increases giving to causes other than religion in
2005 with about €53 when sociodemographic characteristics and dona-
tions in 2001 are taken into account. Surprisingly, the effect of learning
about the accountability program on giving to causes other than religion is
smaller than the effect on religious giving.
The results in the second column also show that donations to causes
other than religion in 2005 are less stable over time than religious giving.
In addition, there is a “spill-over effect” of religious giving to nonreligious
giving: donations to causes other than religion in 2005 are also correlated
with donations to religion in 2001. An additional €100 to religion in 2001
is associated with an additional €42 to other causes four years later.
Interestingly, such a spill-over effect did not appear in the analysis of
religious giving. Involvement in religious organizations spills over into
involvement in other organizations, but the reverse is not the case. Similar
ﬁndings have been reported earlier for giving in the USA (Wilhelm et al.,
2007) and for volunteering in the Netherlands (Ruiter and Bekkers,
2008).
Finally, the second column shows that attitudes toward charitable
organizations are related to nonreligious giving. Higher charitable con-
ﬁdence and more positive perceptions of the proportion of funds raised
spent on programs are associated with higher donations.
The effects of learning about the accountability club
on attitudes toward fundraising organizations
Table 11.3 tests the inﬂuence of learning about the CBF account-
ability program between 2002 and 2004 on conﬁdence in fundraising
organizations, beliefs about program spending, and irritation about
fundraising organizations (all measured in 2006). The analyses
include measures of the same variables in 2004, such that the effects
of the other variables can be interpreted as the effects on changes in
attitudes.
Although the analyses in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show that most of the
effect of learning about the CBF program is not a result of these attitudes,
it is still possible that the accountability program does change them. If the
accountability program works as intended, it should not only affect the
magnitude of giving, but also improve the quality of decisionmaking about
giving. Donors should obtain more accurate information about the costs
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of fundraising and program spending and may be less irritated by fund-
raising campaigns when they know that an independent monitoring
agency evaluates fundraising organizations.
However, learning about the accountability program between 2002 and
2006 has not changed the attitudes towards fundraising organizations
much, controlling for conﬁdence in 2004. There is a small and marginally
signiﬁcant positive effect of learning about the system on charitable con-
ﬁdence. This ﬁnding suggests that learning about the system increases
conﬁdence in charitable organizations a little. Learning about the system
is not associated with irritation about the number of appeals or beliefs
about program spending.13
Table 11.3 Regression analyses of conﬁdence, irritation about fundraising
campaigns, and beliefs about program spending in 2006 (n=692)
Conﬁdence Irritation Program spending
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
2004 measure .605 *** .345 *** .375 ***
Aware already .109 (*) .050 −2.527 *
Learned about CBF .131 (*) .047 .140
Education .039 * −.050 ** −.356
Income (×10k) .008 −.006 −.336
Attendance −.002 −.002 .007
High trust .174 ** −.166 * −1.527
Amount religion 2001 (×100) .034 .091 −.030
Amount other 2001 (×100) .098 .147 −.023
CBF* amount religion 2001 −.013 .150 −1.193
CBF* amount other 2001 −.000 −.060 1.894
Adj. R square. 3809. 2404. 2010
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Included in all regression models are
controls for age, gender, marital status, working status, home ownership, town size, and
religious afﬁliation.
13 Additional analyses reveal an interesting interaction effect of learning about the account-
ability program with donations in 2001 on charitable conﬁdence in 2004. Conﬁdence in
fundraising organizations in 2004 was higher among larger donors to causes other than
religion after learning about the accountability program between 2002 and 2004. This
effect does not occur among large donors to religious organizations, nor among small
donors. There are no signiﬁcant interaction effects of donations in 2001 with learning
about accreditation on irritation or beliefs about program spending. These analyses are
available from the author.
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The results in Table 11.3 also reveal that persons with higher levels of
education, lower incomes, and a high level of trust in fellow citizens have
more positive attitudes toward fundraising organizations.
The effect of accreditation on fundraising income
The preceding analyses have shown how households change their giving
and perceptions of fundraising organizations after learning about the CBF
accountability club. Now I shift the perspective from donors to the receiv-
ing organizations. What are the beneﬁts of accreditation for fundraising
organizations in terms of fundraising income? Do fundraising organiza-
tions raise more funds when they are accredited? Howmuch is the beneﬁt
of accreditation? Which types of nonproﬁt organizations beneﬁt the most
from accreditation?
To answer these questions, I analyze data from the Central Bureau of
Fundraising on the income of 157 major fundraising nonproﬁt organiza-
tions in the period 1994–2004. Since 1994, these nonproﬁt organizations
have submitted annual reports to the CBF each year.14 Among other
things, the database contains data on gross fundraising income and fund-
raising costs (in euros), the sector in which the organization is active, the
work area of the organization (the Netherlands, abroad, or both), and
whether the organization was accredited. These data were available for
each year in the period 1994–2004 in which the organization submitted
ﬁnancial statements to CBF. Raw amounts reported in the database were
deﬂated with the annual mutation in the consumer price index, taking
1994 as the base year. Total inﬂation in the 1994–2004 period was 25.8
percent, while average fundraising income grew by 32.1 percent. All
amounts were log-transformed before analyses.
A ﬁxed effects regression model is used to estimate the effect of accred-
itation on fundraising income. When studying effects of nonrandom
changes using longitudinal data, this model is usually preferred over
random effects regression models (Halaby, 2004).15 Fixed effects models
are more appropriate than random effects models when studying the
effects of an intervention that is not randomly assigned to actors,
but actors are selected into treatment. This is certainly the case for the
accreditation of fundraising organizations. Whether or not – and if so,
14 The original dataset contained data on a much larger number of fundraising organiza-
tions, increasing over time, from 345 in 1994 to 548 in 2004. In the analyses presented
here, all organizations that had missing observations in one or more years were disre-
garded to rule out composition effects. Analyses on the full sample of organizations yield
somewhat weaker effects for most variables.
15 The Hausman test for model 1 is highly signiﬁcant, χ2=592.57 (df=6), p<.000.
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when – nonproﬁt organizations are accredited is not a randomly occurring
event. The system started in 1997 with thirteen organizations.16 In sub-
sequent years, increasing numbers of organizations applied for the accred-
itation seal, also in other sectors than health. The ﬁxed effects regression
model rules out the possibility that stable, unobserved characteristics of
nonproﬁt organizations, such as the sector in which the organization
operates, confound the effects of accreditation (Allison, 1994).17
In order to evaluate themagnitude of the effects of accreditation, lagged
fundraising income, fundraising costs in the current year, the preceding
year, and two years before are included in the regression models. In
addition, the analyses include a variable “year” to model the average
annual growth in fundraising income.
Model 1 of Table 11.4 yields an estimate of the effect of accreditation of
6.7 percent, controlling for lagged fundraising income, fundraising costs
in the current year, lagged fundraising costs, and two-year fundraising
costs, and year. This result supports hypothesis 1.
Model 1 of Table 11.4 also reveals an estimate of the effect of lagged
fundraising income of 2.21 percent, indicating that fundraising income in
the current year is weakly dependent on fundraising income in the past
year.18 The effect of fundraising costs of .337 indicates that a 10 percent
increase in fundraising expenditure raises 3.4 percentmore funds the next
year. Fundraising costs in the preceding year have an unexpected negative
effect. There is no effect of year, indicating that fundraising income grew
along with inﬂation in the period 1994–2004.
Model 2 shows that the effect of accreditation is not constant in the
period 1994–2004. The main effect of accreditation in this model repre-
sents the average effect of accreditation in the years 1994–2002. The
16 TheCBF announced its plan for an accreditation program in the early 1990s. It was tested
among a group of three well-known fundraising organizations (NOVIB (currently Oxfam
Netherlands), the Asthma Fund, and the World Wildlife Fund) that were approved in
1995 but were not allowed to use the seal until December 1996. Another group of ten
organizations entered the procedure in 1996, and another four were accredited on July 1,
1997. The majority of these frontrunners were large health charities (e.g., Cancer
Foundation, Diabetes Foundation, Kidney Foundation).
17 I also ran “difference in difference” models using the generalized method of moments
(GMM; Arellano and Bond, 1991) because the ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation may be biased as
a result of autocorrelations among the residuals of the dependent variable and its lag.
Estimates of a GMMmodel including the same variables produced very similar results as
reported in Table 11.4, but without signiﬁcant lagged fundraising income effects (results
available upon request). However, in this model as well as a wide range of other model
speciﬁcations, Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions in GMM models were always
signiﬁcant, and autocovariance in residuals remained a problem. This implies that also
the GMM speciﬁcation may have produced biased estimates.
18 This estimate is much lower than the estimate from anOLS (.968) or random effects GLS
(.917).
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interaction term represents the effect of accreditation in 2003 and 2004.
These years are considered separately because two organizations (Plan
Netherlands and the Dutch Heart Association) received a great deal of
attention in the media with the publication of Managers’ salaries.
Fundraising income of these organizations declined in response to these
media reports. The results of model 2 shows that fundraising organiza-
tions that were accredited in 2003 and 2004 reaped no beneﬁts of accred-
itation in these years; the main effect of accreditation together with the
interaction effect for the years 2003 and 2004 is about zero. In an analysis
excluding the two organizations that suffered in the media (Plan
Netherlands and the Dutch Heart Association) the same signiﬁcantly
negative effect of accreditation in the years 2003 and 2004 is observed.
This suggests that the decrease in the effect of accreditation in these years
is not due to the decrease in fundraising income for these two organiza-
tions resulting from negative media reports, but may reﬂect a decrease in
the credibility of the accreditation seal across the whole philanthropic
sector.19 It is likely that the media reports in these years made the public
aware that the accountability program has no standards regarding the
salaries of employees of fundraising organizations. These media reports
can be viewed as exogenous shocks that led to external pressure to create
more stringent standards.
Who beneﬁts most?
Models 3 and 4 of Table 11.4 test the effects of accreditation among
speciﬁc groups of fundraising organizations. These analyses yield two
conclusions. First, for organizations with low fundraising income (less
than €200,000, n=6) accreditation yielded signiﬁcantly smaller beneﬁts
than for other organizations. Second, religious organizations and interna-
tional development organizations tended to beneﬁt less than other
organizations.
The ﬁrst conclusion is discomforting for the group of small organiza-
tions that have submitted ﬁnancial statements to the CBF since 1994. The
cost of the accreditation procedure (about €4,500) is a substantial amount
for small fundraising organizations, and it did not beneﬁt them at all.
Accreditation actually reduced fundraising income by almost 4 percent
19 I ruled out the possibility that the beneﬁt of accreditation for fundraising organizations is
largest in the ﬁrst year, and declines as organizations have the seal for a longer period of
time. An analysis including interaction terms for all years shows a sudden drop in the
effect of accreditation in 2003 and 2004, with 1997 and 1999 being better than the average
years (2000–2001).
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(.073–.112=−.039). Taking an organization with fundraising income of
€500,000 as an example, the beneﬁt of accreditation in the next year
(€36,500) easily exceeded the costs. It should be noted, however, that
the negative result for the small organizations does not emerge from the
larger sample of organizations that submitted ﬁnancial statements in at
least two years. Among those organizations, the beneﬁt of accreditation
for the group of small organizations was equal to the beneﬁt for larger
organizations (results available upon request).
The second conclusion stands in contrast to hypothesis 6 that interna-
tional development organizations would beneﬁt more from accreditation.
The results show that international development organizations hardly
beneﬁt at all from accreditation in the period 1994–2004. The net beneﬁt
for international development organizations is only 1.8 percent per year
(.135–.117).20
Health organizations, which formed the majority of the organizations
that were accredited at the start of the system, also reaped no additional
beneﬁts from accreditation. In fact, the beneﬁt for health organizations
is slightly smaller even than for organizations in other sectors (except
international development and religious organizations). Remember that
the initial group of organizations was dominated by health organiza-
tions. Combining the results of the present analysis with the earlier
result that the beneﬁt of accreditation was larger in 1997 and 1999,
I infer that the initial group of organizations beneﬁted more not because
they were dominated by health organizations, but because they started
in 1997, and that year and 1999 were particularly good years for
fundraising.
Finally, I ﬁnd that religious organizations that were accredited bene-
ﬁted less from accreditation than organizations in other sectors (except
health and international development organizations). This result is sur-
prising given the earlier result that religious organizations attracted don-
ations from those who learned about the accreditation system. That result
was driven by the increase in donations to churches that did not join the
accreditation program. The present result is driven by religious organiza-
tions that did join the program.
20 To some extent, this result is speciﬁc for those organizations that submitted ﬁnancial
statements throughout the entire period studied (1994–2004). In an analysis of all
organizations that provided at least two years of data, the net beneﬁt for international
development organizations is 3 percent (available upon request). The result is not due to
changes in fundraising costs after accreditation because fundraising costs are included in
the model. The result is also not a result of differences in size between international
development organizations and other organizations because the effect is virtually the same
when the interactions of model 1 are included.
The beneﬁts of accreditation clubs in the Netherlands 271
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/1499314/WORKINGFOLDER/GGT/9780521763141C11.3D 272 [253–280] 13.5.2010 9:11PM
Conclusion
The ﬁndings support the view that accountability clubs involving accred-
itation may help to solve the key accountability challenges for nonproﬁts:
the fundraising problem faced by nonproﬁt organizations and the trust
problem for donors. I found support for hypothesis 1 that accreditation
increases the fundraising income of nonproﬁt organizations. I found an
average 6.7 percent increase in fundraising income after accreditation in
the period 1994–2004. I also found support for hypothesis 2 that individ-
uals who learn about the accountability program increase their donations
to charitable causes. The effect of accreditation is about €115 between
2002 and 2006. Only weak support was found for hypothesis 3, that
learning about accreditation increases conﬁdence in charitable organiza-
tions. No support was obtained for the hypothesis that learning about
accreditation increases giving through enhanced conﬁdence.
Among larger donors to causes other than religion, conﬁdence did
increase after learning about the accreditation, as did their giving. This
ﬁnding supports the hypothesis that learning about accreditation affects
large donorsmore strongly than small donors. However, a large part of the
effect of accreditation remains unexplained. Perhaps accreditation merely
justiﬁes donations without improving conﬁdence. When an independent
monitoring agency accredits a fundraising organization that a donor is
supporting, the donor may not necessarily feel more conﬁdence in the
organization, but will feel justiﬁed in giving. Further research is clearly
needed to test this hypothesis.
Finally, the data suggest that the beneﬁts of accreditation are smaller for
international fundraising organizations. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to
the hypothesis that international fundraising organizations aremore strongly
affected by accreditation than other organizations. It is unclear why this is
the case. Because the trust problem is most pressing for international devel-
opment organizations, one would expect them to beneﬁt most strongly from
the accountability program.With the present data it is difﬁcult to explain this
anomaly. Another unexpected ﬁnding that remains to be explained is that
religious organizations failed to reap beneﬁts from accreditation.
Discussion
The focus of this chapter has been on the beneﬁts of participation in an
accreditation club for fundraising organizations themselves in terms of
fundraising income. But donors are also likely to gain from the account-
ability program when fundraising organizations comply with the standards
of excellence required to bear the seal. It is likely that the quality of internal
organization in general and accounting practices in particular, as well as
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transparency and accountability to donors, increases because of accredita-
tion. However, these changes in nonproﬁt behavior are more difﬁcult to
measure and quantify and could not be studied in the present chapter.
Another area for future research is to study the decision to join an
accreditation program. The CBF database only contains data on organ-
izations that have joined and submitted ﬁnancial statements to the CBF. It
is natural to assume that this reﬂects a willingness to be transparent and an
interest in accreditation. The development of fundraising income among
organizations that did not submit ﬁnancial statements remains unclear. It
is even impossible to say how selective the sample of organizations is that is
studied in the present chapter, because basic data on the universe of
fundraising organizations are lacking in the Netherlands.
Despite its advantages, the CBF accountability club has some imper-
fections. The club is somewhat “leaky”: churches have beneﬁted from the
system even though they did not join the program. While this can be
viewed as “free-riding,” it can also be viewed as a sign that the accred-
itation system is a public good beneﬁting the charitable sector as a whole,
and not just its members.
As in for-proﬁt markets (Bennet and McCrohan, 1993), the costs
associated with accreditation may be too high for small fundraising organ-
izations. For the ﬁrst ﬁve years, the accreditation seal costs on average
€3,872 (€3,439 in the next ﬁve years). Taking the 6.7 percent from
Table 11.4 as an estimate of the average increase in fundraising income,
fundraising income needs to be at least €57,791 a year for a minimum of
ﬁve years to make the accreditation procedure worth while from an
economic perspective. For organizations with fundraising income below
this threshold the investment in the seal does not pay off.
In addition the club standards may limit participation. The maximum
fundraising cost ratio of 25 percent may also be unfair to small organiza-
tions. This ceiling punishes new organizations, and organizations that are
trying to raise funds for unpopular causes (Steinberg, 1986). The ceiling
also punishes organizations that have no volunteers available for door-to-
door fundraising. Fundraising nonproﬁt organizations receive a signiﬁ-
cant source of income at virtually no cost when they can use volunteer
fundraisers. This is mainly the case for large, established health charities
like theDutchHeart Association and the Cancer Foundation (KWF). For
a new organization, the ceiling of 25 percent may pose a problem, even
when the organization has been active three years. The CBF acknowl-
edges that the maximum of 25 percent may be exceeded in speciﬁc
circumstances, and effectively uses a three-year average for fundraising
costs in the evaluation procedure. This makes sense but may still be too
stringent for speciﬁc types of nonproﬁt organizations.
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A potential unintended side-effect of the increasing awareness of the
accreditation seal and the 25 percent maximum for fundraising costs (the
best-known standard) is that a competition for low fundraising costs may
emerge. In order to present low fundraising costs to the public, fund-
raising organizations may be tempted to reduce fundraising costs admin-
istratively through violations of the principle of joint cost allocation or
considering fundraising campaigns as programs when they contain educa-
tional material (Hager, 2003). At present, CBF accounting rules are not
clear-cut on this issue. Although there are limits to the level of detail of
standards that can be speciﬁed and the costs of enforcement of these
standards, more speciﬁc guidelines are needed here in order to prevent
misrepresentation of fundraising costs.
A ﬁnal limitation of the accountability program is that it contains no
standards regarding the salaries of managers. The Dutch public clearly
desires more regulation and transparency here. Violations of (low) expect-
ations on salaries caused a drop in fundraising income for two well-known
fundraising organizations in 2003 and 2004. The analyses revealed that the
accreditation seal lost its effect also for other organizations precisely in
these years. A recent study shows that the Dutch public is increasingly
concerned about the salaries of managers of fundraising organizations
(WWAV, 2008). To keep the public’s trust, it may be necessary to include
rules on salaries for managers of fundraising organizations in the CBF
standards of excellence. Also, enforcement of existing rules becomesmore
important if the program is to retain credibility among the public. Perhaps
this is one of the reasons why the CBF has recently withheld accreditation
to a few organizations. Adding standards onManagers’ salariesmay also be
a wise decision for the CBF. If members make rational decisions, they will
leave a program without such rules if that does not pay off.
This chapter has provided a test of two key tenets of voluntary account-
ability clubs. First, the signals accountability clubs generate are received
by key nonproﬁt donors and – if the club is strong enough – provide a
credible signal. Second, principals are willing to reward nonproﬁts for
credible signals. In the case of the CBF, many Dutch donors are aware of
the accreditation program and those who are aware contribute more to
organizations that participate in the program. Accredited organizations
also see their donations rise.
What features of the CBF club account for these results? In comparison
with many other clubs studied in this volume, the CBF is a relatively
strong club. This in itself is a surprising fact. CBF shares similarities with
the accreditation clubs in health and education in the USA studied by
Bowman in this volume (chapter 3). Bowman argues that these clubs are
strong because the nonproﬁts face a dominant principal, the US federal
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government, that essentially mandates participation in these clubs. That is
not the case in the Netherlands. The CBF emerged from self-regulation
efforts by fundraising organizations. Why such self-regulation efforts have
not developed into strong clubs in other countries is a pressing issue for
future research. To study this issue, cross-national comparative data on
the emergence of accountability clubs are needed.
Without access to such data, I can only offer speculative hypotheses.
One such hypothesis is that strong clubs emerge more easily in smaller
philanthropic markets. Cooperation is much easier to organize in small
groups (Olson, 1965). The Dutch philanthropic market is relatively small
compared with that of the USA. It should come as no surprise that Dutch
fundraising organizations are well-organized.21
Another hypothesis is that competition leads to weak clubs. In the US
state associations studied by Tschirhart in chapter 4 of this volume, any
given nonproﬁt might have more choices about different clubs to join.
Fundraising organizations will favor joining a club that does not have
strong standards to reduce costs. In addition, donors will ﬁnd it harder
to obtain good information about the club and to identify what is a
credible club. The CBF faces little competition from other clubs. In the
absence of such competition, the CBF seal signals to the majority of
donors that accredited organizations conform to the standards.
Appendix
Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey
In the ﬁrst wave of the GINPS, which was collected in May 2002,
respondents reported about donations in the calendar year 2001. In the
second wave, which was collected two years later, in May 2004, respond-
ents reported about donations in the calendar year 2003. In the third wave
(May 2006) donations in the calendar year 2005 were reported. The
purpose of the analyses below is to see how giving to nonproﬁt organiza-
tions changes among respondents who learned about the CBF seal
between 2002 and 2004 and among those who did not.
21 Switzerland is another example of a relatively small country with a strong club (ZEWO).
Group size cannot be the only factor. Despite its size, Germany also has a strong club
(DZI). Also one wonders why a strong club has not emerged in the Czech Republic (see
chapter 7 by Ortmann and Svítková in this volume). The Czech Republic is also a
relatively small country. However, Ortmann suggests that the past decades of communist
rule in the country do not seem to have created a fertile ground for cooperation among
civil society organizations.
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In all three waves, respondents reported whether they “knew the CBF
seal for fundraising organizations” (no/yes). In 2002, 33.7 percent reported
awareness of the CBF seal. In 2004, this proportion had grown to 42.9
percent; in 2006 it was back to 38.8 percent. Of those whowere unaware of
the existence of the CBF seal inMay 2002 and also participated in the third
wave of the survey (n=444), 25.7 percent had learned about it four years
later. The major increase in awareness of the accountability program took
place between 2002 and 2004, when 22.8 percent of the respondents who
were unaware of the system in the ﬁrst wave learned about it.
Most of the analyses will be conducted on the respondents who were
unaware of the accountability program in 2002. Charitable donations
were measured in waves with extensive survey modules (called
“Method-Area” modules by Rooney et al., 2004). I used reports on the
amount donated to nonproﬁt organizations in nine different areas (reli-
gion, international affairs, health, arts and culture, public and social
beneﬁt, environment/wildlife and animal protection, education and
research, sports and recreation, and “other”) to construct three measures
for both survey years: (1) total amount donated; (2) amount donated to
religion; (3) amount donated to causes other than religion. I distinguish
religious from nonreligious contributions because none of the churches in
the Netherlands has right to bear the accreditation seal. The mean for the
total amount donated in 2001 among respondents who participated in all
three waves (n=703) was €245; in 2003 it was €259; in 2005 it was €271.
In the analyses I regress donations in 2003 and 2005 on learning about
the system, controlling for potential confounding variables to mitigate the
concern that changes in giving between those who learned about the
accountability program and those who did not are due not to learning
about the system but to some other characteristics. It could be, for
instance, that those who gave more to nonproﬁt organizations in 2001
are more likely to increase their giving in the 2001–2005 period and that
they are also more likely to learn about the accountability program, but
that the latter does not cause the former.22
As confounding variables I include the amount donated in 2001, gen-
eralized trust, the number of solicitations received (both measured in
2002), and a series of sociodemographic variables that are often found
to be related to philanthropy: household income (log-transformed, orig-
inally measured in twenty-four categories ranging from €2,500 to
22 Note that the measures of giving refer to 2003 and 2005, respectively, and awareness of
the CBF system was measured in May 2004 and May 2006. For respondents who have
learned about the CBF system after giving, awareness of the system could not have
inﬂuenced giving. This time lag introduces a downward bias in the effect of accreditation.
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€300,000, higher incomes truncated), marital status (dummy variable for
being married), having children (1=yes), working status (dummy varia-
bles for working part-time or having no paid work; full-time paid work is
the reference category), level of education (seven categories, ranging from
primary education to post-doctoral degree), gender (female=1), age, town
size (in thousands of inhabitants), and ﬁve dummy variables for religious
afﬁliation (Catholic, Reformed Protestant, Rereformed Protestant, other
Christian afﬁliation, nonChristian afﬁliation; no religious afﬁliation being
the reference category). All these variables were measured in the 2002
survey.
Generalized social trust was also measured in 2002 with two items that
are commonly used as two alternatives: “In general, most people can be
trusted” and “You can’t be too careful in dealing with other people.”
Responses to these questions were strongly correlated (r=.42). Because
the effect of trust seems to be nonlinear (Bekkers, 2003) I did not use the
original 1–5 scores, but recoded the average of the two items into a
dichotomous “high trust” variable. Those with a trust score above the
mean were considered as “high trustors.”
Solicitations for contributions to charitable organizations were meas-
ured with a list of the ten different types of methods that nonproﬁt
organizations use most frequently to raise funds. For each method, the
respondent indicated whether she had been asked to donate to nonproﬁt
organizations in the two weeks prior to the 2004 survey: 60.4 percent of
the respondents reported at least one solicitation in the past two weeks.
We distinguished between personal solicitations (42.2 percent) and
impersonal solicitations (29.4 percent).
Charitable conﬁdence was measured in 2004 with a single item asking
“How much conﬁdence do you have in “charitable causes’?” on a scale
from 1 (“none at all”) to 5 (“very much”): 3.1 percent reported no
conﬁdence at all, 18.0 percent little conﬁdence, 49.0 percent moderate,
29.5 percent much conﬁdence, and 0.4 percent very much. Ameasure for
irritation about fundraising campaigns ranging from 0 to 5 was con-
structed from two variables: whether people ever felt irritated by the
number of solicitations for charitable contributions they received (0 if
not, reported by 48.3 percent), and if yes, to what extent they felt irritated
(1 “very little” to 4 “very much”, reported by 5.6 percent).
CBF database
The sample of fundraising organizations in the CBF database does not
represent a random sample of the population of fundraising organizations.
“Bad apples” will be underrepresented because they are unlikely to have
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annual reports at all and if so, they will be unlikely to submit them to
a monitoring agency. The mean amount raised grew from €3.9 million
in 1997 to €4.7 million in 2004 (in concurrent euros). Fundraising
costs increased too, and even more strongly in relative terms, from
€559,000 in 1997 to €890,000 in 2004. In the ﬁrst three years of the
existence of the accountability program, 52 percent of the organizations
that provided ﬁnancial statements throughout the whole period were
accredited (24 percent of all organizations in the sample that provided
more than two years of data). The proportion grew at a slower pace in
consecutive years, to about 65 percent in 2004 (42 percent of organiza-
tions that provided more than two years of data).
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